MSC Napoli Report - November 2008
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 | This Report focuses on capturing the facts and actions taken by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency in dealing with the MSC Napoli incident. This Report also seeks to capture the lessons learned, conclusions reached and recommendations for future responses. The Report provides 20 conclusions/lessons learned. These points are highlighted as they provide a conclusion which reinforces a previously learned lesson. Where it is a lesson learned for future responses the conclusion/lesson learned is taken forward as a recommendation. The Report provides 11 recommendations. Of these 11 recommendations: Recommendations 1 and 2 cover communications and information flow between the marine and land response units Recommendations 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8 will be taken forward to the next review of the NCP and include:
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Recommendations 7 and 9 are for the MCA to address by the regular training of media ‘talking heads’ and Acting Receivers of Wreck Recommendation 10 is for the lead organisations in the conversion of Portland Port into a container terminal to produce a report to record their learning points Recommendation 1 is for the organisations involved in the Environmental Impact Assessment process to review how the process can be expedited in the future.
Overall the UK’s response to this incident is viewed internationally as a massive success. Major pollution of the UK’s waters and coastline was avoided and more than forty organisations worked together to achieve a successful outcome.
Overview of incident
 | On 18 January 2007, the MSC Napoli was on passage in the English Channel, loaded with 2,318 containers and bound for South Africa when she suffered a catastrophic hull failure and got into severe difficulties. The French authorities assessed a number of possible locations for a place of refuge in French waters, however, the south coast of England provided better options for a place of refuge. The conclusion was that the least environmentally risky option was to tow the vessel to a place of refuge in UK waters. Working with the French authorities, the Secretary of State’s Representative for Maritime Salvage and Intervention (SOSREP) decided that the ship was in danger of breaking up and polluting the English Channel and should be towed to Portland Harbour. The SOSREP consulted with local authorities and environmental bodies to the fullest extent possible within the time available. With the condition of the ship deteriorating rapidly, it was necessary for the salvors and the SOSREP to make a fast decision in order to avert a potential environmental catastrophe. |
During towing, the weather deteriorated and the SOSREP decided to beach the ship in Lyme Bay to minimise the pollution threat. MSC Napoli was beached in Lyme Bay on 20 January 2007. Over the next six months the 3,500 tonnes of fuel oil and the containers were systematically removed. The final container was removed on 17 May 2007. Explosives were used to split the MSC Napoli into two sections. On 20 July, the ship was successfully split into two pieces and the bow section was towed a short distance away. The bow section of MSC Napoli was removed from Lyme Bay and taken to Harland and Wolff’s dismantling facility in Belfast in mid-August 2007. The remaining stern section was left in situ in Lyme Bay, to be cut up and taken away to a recycling facility. The successful way in which the MSC Napoli was handled demonstrates the effectiveness of the UK’s arrangements for handling incidents at sea and the professionalism of all of those involved. The UK’s handling of MSC Napoli has received widespread praise. |  |
Recommendations
A summary of the Report recommendations is provided below. Chapter 17 provides more detail.
- R.1 The MCA should inform other Category 1 and 2 responders about the roles of the SOSREP in salvage and the role of other MCA units in counter pollution activities, including the command and control procedures that are implemented at the scene of a maritime incident. The current emphasis in the MCA’s Counter Pollution and Response Branch has been on training courses for local authorities. Briefing Local Resilience Forums and Strategic Coordination Groups, and conducting suitable exercises with other responders, may be a more effective way of explaining the procedures that are in place for shipping incidents of this nature.
- R.2 Communication of the potential level of risk between the Salvage Control Unit (where the most up-to-date information is available) and any land co-ordinated response organisation needs to be improved. Ways of ensuring better information flow should be examined by the MCA.
- R.3 The next review of the National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution should consider the scope for dealing with medium sized incidents through the use of combined response centres, i.e. the Marine Response Centre and the Shoreline Response Centre merging to form one unit. During the review process the MCA could also cover mechanisms for dealing with beached material other than oil and chemicals.
- R.4 In the next review of the NCP consideration needs to be given to the interface between the at-sea, shore and near shore protection activities. The review should encompass which bodies are best suited to carry out shoreline protection and clean up.
- R.5 The co-location of response units should be used whenever possible.
- R.6 The use of dispersant on IFO-380 grade oil should continue to be considered as a useful tool in future responses to oil spills of this type.
- R.7 That the MCA continue to regularly train appropriate individuals to be ‘talking heads’ to assist with the MCA’s media response.
- R.8 In the next review of the NCP consideration should be given to the interrelationships between the Civil Contingency representatives and the MCA.
- R.9 It is recommended that a number of MCA officers are trained specifically for the role of Acting Receiver of Wreck and liaison with Police Gold Commanders, and that suitable procedures are added in the appropriate operational manuals.
- R.10 The use of Portland Port and its conversion to a fully operational container terminal involved a huge logistics operation. A great deal of specialist equipment was procured and transported to Portland. It is recommended that the organisations involved in converting a port like Portland Port into a container processing terminal should produce a report to record their learning points.
- R.11 The MCA should explore with the other Agencies involved how
the process of preparing multiple EIAs for a range of options, and achieving agreement from all the
authorities involved could be expedited in future.
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